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 How regime theory and the economic theory 
of international environmental cooperation can learn from each other 
 
 
Abstract 
Economic theorists of international environmental cooperation and regime theorists who 
focus on the environment ask the same two basic research questions: why does interna-
tional environmental cooperation emerge in some cases, but not in others, and why is 
cooperation ‘wide’ and ‘deep’ in some cases, but not in others? Unfortunately, the two 
schools of thought do not collaborate much in their respective attempts to answer these 
and related questions. Instead, mutual neglect is the general rule. This paper tries to 
show how regime theory can learn from the findings of the economic theory of interna-
tional environmental cooperation and vice versa and how both can fruitfully learn from 
each other. An exploitation of mutual learning opportunities is likely to lead to a more 
comprehensive understanding of international environmental cooperation and can ulti-
mately result in better informed policy advice. 
 
1 
1. Introduction  
Many environmental problems are truly international or global. They cannot be tackled 
by a single country alone. Hence international cooperation is needed for a solution. But 
whereas environmental policy can use the enforcing power that sovereign nation-states 
ideally have within their territory, in general international environmental policy cannot 
take recourse to a supra-national authority with enforcing powers. International envi-
ronmental cooperation has to be accomplished under anarchy. 
Regime theory has long since addressed the question of how cooperation can be 
achieved and sustained in a world divided into sovereign nation-states.1 It has done so 
with respect to many issues, especially security, economics and finance, not merely the 
environment. Independently from regime theory and starting from around the early 
1990s a branch of international environmental economics that is called here the eco-
nomic theory of international environmental cooperation has engaged in substantial re-
search on the subject as well. It has tackled the question that has traditionally occupied 
regime theorists most: ‘why does cooperation emerge in some cases and not in others?’2 
Unfortunately, the regime theory literature that focuses on the environment is not in-
spired by the results from this research. Similarly, the economic literature on interna-
tional environmental cooperation is to a great extent ignorant of the contributions from 
regime theory and does not consider how it could benefit from a better understanding of 
its findings. 
                                                 
 
 I would like to thank three anonymous referees for helpful comments. 
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 For an overview, see, for example, Haggard and Simmons 1987 and Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittber-
ger 1996. 
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Indicative of this mutual neglect is that the works of Scott Barrett and Carlo Carraro 
— presumably the most prominent representatives of the economic theory of interna-
tional environmental cooperation — are hardly cited in any paper from regime theory. 
Usually, these papers do not mention or take any notice of the major results from the 
economic theory of international environmental cooperation. On the other hand, some of 
the papers of the economic theory of international environmental cooperation do cite 
contributions from regime theory.3 However, reference is often cursory only and major 
results from regime theory are only occasionally integrated into model building. Fur-
thermore, that papers from regime theory are cited in the economic literature of interna-
tional environmental cooperation is the exception rather than the rule. Indicative of this 
neglect is Carraro’s suggestion that ‘the idea of ‘‘issue linkage’’ was originally proposed 
by Folmer et al. (1993) and Cesar and de Zeeuw (1996) to solve the problem of asym-
metries among countries’4, when this proposition actually goes back to early contribu-
tions from regime theory and negotiation theory.5 
In the next two sections, I show how regime theory could benefit from a better under-
standing of the basic findings from the economic theory of international environmental 
cooperation and vice versa. Then several examples are provided on how the two schools 
of thought could fruitfully engage in mutual learning from each other in order to achieve 
international environmental cooperation that is ‘wider’ and ‘deeper’.6 
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 International environmental cooperation is defined here to be ‘wider’ if it includes more countries 
with responsibility for the environmental problem. It is defined here to be ‘deeper’ if it increases the 
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Oran R. Young praises the returns from inter-disciplinary research in international af-
fairs in suggesting that ‘we have entered a period of profound change in our thinking 
about governance in international society that offers an exciting new research agenda for 
students of international affairs and an opportunity to bridge the gap that has long sepa-
rated the main streams of research in the fields of international relations, international 
law, and political science.’7 Young does not include the economic theory of interna-
tional environmental cooperation. One possible reason might be that there still exists a 
gap between the fields he mentions and the economic theory of international environ-
mental cooperation. In a nutshell, it is the aim of this paper to convince readers that it is 
worth while closing this gap. 
 
 
2. Learning from the economic theory of international environmental cooperation 
It would be beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full sketch of the economic the-
ory of international environmental cooperation here. Instead, I shall concentrate on those 
results that might be of special interest to scholars of regime theory. One of the major 
contributions of the economic theory of international environmental cooperation has 
been an elaboration of what the absence of a central state authority in international af-
fairs implies for the scope and depth of cooperation. 
Before I come to this it seems appropriate, however, to explicate the assumptions on 
which the economic theory of international cooperation is based upon. Arguably, four of 
its assumptions are the most important ones: first, it is utilitarian in that it assumes that 
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7
 Young 1994, p. 12. 
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all aspects of decision-making can be captured by utility-relevant costs and benefits and 
that agents maximise a utility function; second, it assumes that agents decide rationally, 
taking into account all available information; third, if it applies game theoretic analysis, 
which it often does, it assumes that there is a unitary actor who, fourth, is faced with a 
well specified payoff matrix. Clearly, these assumptions are rather restrictive. However, 
they are often justified in order to construct a tractable model that results in testable 
propositions. As in other areas of the field, economists have never been very impressed 
by the low degree of realism of its assumptions as long as its propositions have per-
formed well in tests. We will now look at some of the propositions the economic theory 
of international environmental cooperation has arrived at. In the next section, we will 
see, however, that at times the low degree of realism of its assumptions has led to sig-
nificant shortcomings in its propositions. 
 
SELF-ENFORCEMENT AND RENEGOTIATION-PROOFNESS. 
The economic theory of international environmental cooperation has taken the idea of 
‘cooperation under anarchy’8 very seriously and has developed the concepts of self-
enforcing and renegotiation-proof agreements.9 What does this mean? As regards most 
international environmental problems the affected countries are confronted with a basic 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, in the following sense: the countries have an interest in reducing 
emissions that give rise to the problem and all countries are better off with international 
environmental cooperation, but each and every one of them also has an incentive to free-
ride on the others’ efforts and to enjoy the benefits of abatement without incurring any 
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costs of emission reduction. Therefore international agreements normally have to deter 
external free-riding, that is, they have to deter countries that would benefit from emis-
sion reduction from not signing up to the agreement and staying outside. Equally, they 
have to deter internal free-riding, that is, they have to deter signatory countries from not 
complying with the requirements of the agreement. What is important is that the mecha-
nism employed to achieve deterrence has to be self-enforcing in the sense that a recourse 
to an external enforcement agency is not feasible: No country can be forced to sign an 
agreement and signatories cannot be forced to comply with the agreement. 
There exist many mechanisms that could potentially achieve such deterrence. Most of 
them, such as trade and other economic sanctions as well as a refusal to cooperate in 
other issue areas, depend on what has become known as issue linkage –  a topic to 
which I will come back later on. Assuming for the moment that issue linkage is impos-
sible or undesirable for whatever reason, then the only variable left to a country is the 
amount of pollution it emits. Hence, the only mechanism left is to threaten not to under-
take any emission reduction in order to deter external free-riding or to decrease emis-
sions by less than required by the agreement in order to punish non-compliant countries 
and to deter internal free-riding. This threat has to be credible in the sense that it is in 
the interest of the threatening country (or countries) to actually execute the threat when-
ever other countries try to free-ride. In other words, a threat cannot be credible if a coun-
try is worse off after executing the threat than it would be without execution. Non-
credible threats cannot deter because potential free riders will anticipate that they could 
get away with free-riding without being punished. Moreover, an agreement which estab-
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 The major contributions are Barrett 1990, 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1997a, 1997b; Carraro and Siniscalco 
1993; Botteon and Carraro 1997; Endres and Finus 1998; Finus and Rundshagen 1998a, 1998b. But 
see also the references in other notes further below. 
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lishes such a mechanism to deter free-riding has to be renegotiation-proof. This means 
that the threat has to be credible also in the sense that the threatening country (or coun-
tries) must be better off actually executing the threat than refraining from execution and 
renegotiating a new agreement with the free-riding country (or countries). Agreements 
that are not renegotiation-proof cannot deter because potential free riders will anticipate 
that they could strike another deal after free-riding and could therefore get away without 
being punished. 
The concept of renegotiation-proofness is more relevant and significant than might 
be clear at first sight. The suggestion that cooperation under anarchy is possible is often 
implicitly or explicitly based on the Folk Theorem from game theory, which implies that 
full cooperation in an infinite or not obviously finite Prisoner’s Dilemma can be sus-
tained as a subgame perfect equilibrium if the discount rate is ‘sufficiently small’ (the 
shadow of the future is ‘sufficiently long’).10 One prominent supergame strategy that can 
achieve full cooperation as a subgame perfect equilibrium is the so-called trigger strat-
egy. In a two-players game the trigger strategy is defined as follows: start with coopera-
tion and continue cooperation until the other player defects after which defect forever. 
The problem with this and many other strategies is that they are not credible because 
they are not renegotiation-proof. The player who is punished by ‘defection forever’ has 
an incentive to suggest to the punisher to forget about the past and to start mutual coop-
eration anew. The punisher itself has an incentive as well to let bygones be bygones and 
to refrain from punishing forever. Hence the trigger strategy is vulnerable to renegotia-
tion and cannot achieve mutual cooperation in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. 
The players cannot get rid of the incentives for renegotiation because they cannot credi-
bly commit to executing the ‘defect forever’ threat. Renegotiation-proof equilibria are 
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 See, for example, Axelrod (1984). 
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only a subset of subgame perfect equilibria, hence not all subgame perfect equilibria can 
be sustained via renegotiation-proof supergame strategies. 
Renegotiation-proofness is quite a far-reaching requirement. Not only does it rule out 
certain supergame-strategies, it also rules out other proposals on how to promote coop-
eration. Black, Levi and Meza, for example, have shown how a minimum participation 
clause in international agreements can in principle induce more countries to join the 
agreement.11 In their model, there are only two options: either at least as many countries 
sign the agreement as specified by the minimum participation clause or the agreement 
never comes into effect. This mechanism promotes participation as each country has to 
balance the benefits from free-riding against the benefits forgone if it does not sign the 
agreement and thereby contributes to increasing the likelihood that cooperation is inhib-
ited once and for ever. Also, the clause assures each participating country that at least as 
many other countries will cooperate as required by minimum participation, which helps 
to reduce the concerns of the cooperating countries about widespread free-riding. How-
ever, the problem with this device is that it is not renegotiation-proof. If the minimum 
number of countries for the agreement to come into effect is not achieved the first time, 
the signatory countries can always renegotiate and lower the minimum participation 
clause. Alternatively, if the agreement does come into effect, the signatory countries 
have an incentive to revert to free-riding ex post and to break the agreement after it has 
come into effect. Indeed, the more successful the minimum participation clause initially 
was in increasing the number of signatories, the greater the incentive for a potential free-
rider to break it afterwards. 
The economic theory of international environmental cooperation has examined the 
implications on cooperation if countries are restricted to strategies that must be renego-
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tiation-proof. If issue linkage is impossible or undesirable, then one basic result holds: a 
self-enforcing and renegotiation-proof agreement will either consist of only a small sub-
set of affected countries or if many countries are parties to the agreement then the gains 
from cooperation relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium are very small. In other 
words, large-scale cooperation will either not take place as only few countries sign the 
agreement or if it does take place it is virtually irrelevant as the agreed upon cooperation 
improves only marginally on what would have been achieved by unilateral action in the 
absence of the agreement. Cooperation is either narrow (instead of wide) or shallow 
(instead of deep).12 
This result leads us to pessimistic expectations about a solution to an environmental 
problem exactly for those problems, for which international cooperation is most needed. 
To see this, note that for the case where the benefits from emission abatement are high 
and the costs are low (for example, ozone depleting substances), the basic result that 
cooperation will either be narrow or, if wide, will not be deep, does not matter much as 
countries have big incentives to solve the problem unilaterally. The same might even be 
true if the benefits from abatement are relatively low as long as the costs are low as well. 
Similarly, for the case where the benefits from abatement are low and the costs are high, 
the basic result from the economic theory of international environmental cooperation 
does not matter much as even the full cooperative outcome would not do much about 
the environmental problem due to high costs. The case where the basic result is really 
relevant is the one where benefits from abatement are high, but so are costs (for exam-
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 Cooperation can be wider and deeper if emission abatement is characterised by fixed costs, so that 
average costs are falling over a certain range of abatement, or if emission abatement creates positive 
technological externalities, so that abatement by one country reduces the abatement costs by other 
countries — see Heal 1994. 
9 
ple, greenhouse gas emissions). These are exactly the cases where a solution to the envi-
ronmental problem would demand wide and deep cooperation most.13 
The intuitive reason for this most basic result of the economic theory of international 
environmental cooperation is as follows: In order to deter free-riding, an agreement 
must specify that the non free-riding countries increase their emissions relative to an 
agreement without free-riding in order to punish free-riders for not decreasing their 
emissions at all (external free-riding) or by not as much as requested by the agreement 
(internal free-riding). In order to deter, the damage to the potential free-rider caused by 
the increase in emissions must be greater than the potential benefit from free-riding. The 
wider and deeper cooperation is, the higher is the benefit from free-riding so that the 
damage to the potential free-rider must also increase in order to deter free-riding. The 
problem is, however, that the bigger is the damage to the potential free-rider, the bigger 
is the damage to the punishing countries themselves as well. This self-inflicted damage 
due to the emission increase limits the punishment that is available for free-rider deter-
rence. It must not hurt the punishing countries more than the damage caused by the free-
riding. Otherwise it will not be credible as the potential free-rider knows that it is not in 
the best interest of the punishing countries to execute the punishment. 
What is more, there must not exist any incentive for the punishing countries and the 
free-riders to renegotiate the agreement and strike another deal. For this condition to 
hold, the punishment must not be very high or else the damage to the free-riding country 
is big as is its incentive to renegotiate another agreement. Because of these twin reasons 
the credible punishment available cannot be very substantial which means that it cannot 
deter much free-riding. Because external free-riding can be deterred only to a small ex-
tent, free-riding is ubiquitous and the number of countries participating in an agreement 
                                                 
13
 Barrett 1991, pp. 14f. 
10 
is small. Alternatively, because internal free-riding can be deterred only to a small ex-
tent, then the agreement cannot improve much relative to the non-cooperative equilib-
rium in order to keep the incentives for non-compliance small, if the number of signato-
ries is large. 
The consequences of the requirements of self-enforcement and renegotiation-
proofness are challenging for regime theory with its belief in the possibility of wide and 
deep cooperation in spite of anarchy. But is it of any real-world relevance? This is a 
question that is difficult to answer. How do we know whether the gains from coopera-
tion are small relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium? The fact that cooperation 
exists means that we cannot directly observe what the outcome would be without coop-
eration. And how do we know what the full cooperative outcome would look like? The 
few studies that have tried to gain evidence on this question in applying econometric 
techniques have supported the basic finding of the economic theory of international en-
vironmental cooperation: James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler suggest that the Mont-
real-Protocol does not reduce ozone damaging chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) by much 
more than the major producers would have reduced unilaterally out of their own selfish 
interest.14 Hence, the Montreal Protocol ‘may be more symbolic than a true instance of a 
cooperative equilibrium, since nations’ CFC reductions prior to the treaty taking effect 
appear to fit the predictions of a single-shot Nash equilibrium’.15 Similarly, Murdoch, 
Sandler and Keith Sargent find that for the Helsinki-Protocol limiting SO2-emissions 
and for the Sofia-Protocol limiting NOx-emissions the cooperative gains are small rela-
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15
 ibid., pp. 332f. 
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tive to the non-cooperative equilibrium: ‘...nations achieved emission reduction levels 
and then drafted the treaty with these levels as targets.’16  
 
LEAKAGE. Another major topic where regime theory could learn from the economic 
theory of international environmental cooperation is the aspect of leakage and how leak-
age exacerbates the problems of free-riding. Leakage describes the phenomenon that a 
decrease in emissions by the participants to an agreement is counter-acted by an increase 
of emissions by non-members. Such an increase can be a deliberate decision by the free-
riding countries. Because the decrease in emissions by the participants lowers the mar-
ginal social damage of emissions by the non-participants their non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium emissions rise. These non-members will therefore usually find it in their 
own best interest to deliberately increase emissions. However, this is just part of the 
story. The other reasons why emissions of non-participants might rise are more subtle 
and can hardly be traced back to a deliberate policy by these countries to exploit the 
emissions reductions of others. To understand this point, take the example of carbon 
dioxide emissions. If a sub-set of all countries agrees on limiting their carbon dioxide 
emissions, then production of carbon-intensive goods and services becomes relatively 
more expensive in these countries. Comparative advantage in these goods and services 
shifts to the non-participating countries who increase their production of carbon-
intensive goods and services. Similarly, some especially carbon-intensive industries 
might migrate from signatory to non-signatory countries. Also, the reduction in demand 
for fossil fuels due to the limitation of carbon dioxide emissions by the participants to 
the agreement will lower world fossil fuel prices which increases demand for fossil fuels 
in non-member countries. All of these feedback mechanisms lead to an increase of 
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emissions by non-participants quite involuntarily, that is, without the participating coun-
tries being able to blame the non-members for deliberately exploiting their emission 
reductions. How significant leakage would be depends on the underlying assumptions 
about how many countries form an agreement, reduce emissions by how much and use 
which instrument for emission reductions. Econometric estimates show that leakage 
could be anywhere between around 5% and 30%.17 In any case, leakage can potentially 
be a quite important obstacle for international environmental agreements and it would 
certainly pay regime theory to give more attention to the ways in which the benefits of 
international environmental cooperation can leak away. 
One problem is how to distinguish leakage that is due to price effects and shifts in 
comparative advantage from free-riding proper. Another problem is that leakage is very 
hard to avoid. Peter Bohm suggests that participating countries could purchase or lease 
fossil fuel deposits in order to neutralise the price effects from lower demand, but this 
suggestion seems to be utterly unrealistic.18 Another theoretical possibility is to restrict 
imports of carbon-intensive goods from non-participating countries. As this would af-
fect a wide range of goods, it would almost certainly clash with international trade re-
gimes such as the World Trade Organization, however, and is therefore not likely to be 
employed. 
On the other hand, the existence of substantial leakage can also induce the formation 
of international environmental agreements with a large number of participating coun-
tries. This is because, all other things equal, the return from large-scale cooperation is 
higher if leakage is a substantial problem. These two countervailing effects of leakage 
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can imply that two equilibria exist: one with few and one with very many participating 
countries.19 
 
STRATEGIC INCENTIVES. More generally, regime theory could learn from the eco-
nomic theory of international environmental cooperation about the strategic effects of 
certain measures that appear to promote cooperation, but might indeed very well reduce 
cooperation. To give an example: side-payments and joint implementation measures are 
often thought of as being beneficial for international cooperation as they induce non-
participant countries to engage in some form of emission reduction as well. The model 
of Michael Hoel and Kerstin Schneider suggest, however, that the very existence of 
these measures can represent a very strong strategic incentive for potential participants 
to stay out of the agreement so that they have to be ‘bought into it’ later on.20 Perversely, 
these unintended strategic side-effects can more than compensate for any cooperation 
gains side-payments and joint implementation measures can bring about. Furthermore, 
the model of Franz Wirl, Claus Huber and I.O. Walker shows that due to strategic incen-
tives in joint implementation, cheating on both sides can be pervasive and the emission 
reductions achieved via joint implementation can be largely faked rather than real.21 
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3. Learning from regime theory 
Regime theory covers a wide and broad range of approaches towards the study of inter-
national regimes.22 It would be impossible to provide a complete overview here.23 In-
stead I shall illustrate for a number of topics how the economic theory of international 
environmental cooperation could learn from regime theory. 
The first issue has to do with the coordinating function of regimes. Many scholars of 
the economic theory of international environmental cooperation point out that their 
models are characterised by multiple equilibria that differ on how much cooperation is 
achieved and who gains by how much relative to others.24 On this they could learn from 
regime theory on how regimes create ‘bargaining forums’25 to coordinate the selection 
of certain equilibria.26 Without explicitly referring to the regime theory literature, Mich-
ele Botteon and Carraro acknowledge the beneficial role regimes can play in stating that 
‘how to move from one equilibrium to the other is a matter of coordination, which de-
mands for new international institutions’.27 Similarly, Engelbert J. Dockner and Ngo 
                                                 
22
 Regimes should be understood here as ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international rela-
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 See Haggard and Simmons 1987 and Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1996 for an overview of 
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theory in their analysis. See, for example, Niou and Ordeshook 1994, p. 220; Kydd and Snidal 1995. 
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 Levy, Keohane and Haas 1993, p. 40. 
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 Compare Morrow 1994. At least some economists seem to recognise this function of regimes at last, 
see Ecchia and Mariotti 1998. 
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 Botteon and Carraro 1997, p. 17. 
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Van Long implicitly refer to regimes when they state that ‘our results suggest that there 
are good reasons for negotiators to meet and communicate even if no contracts can be 
expected to be signed’ and that ‘presumably preplay negotiations would lead to the 
choice of the most efficient strategy pair’.28 ‘Cheap talk’, often denounced by econo-
mists as irrelevant because of its non-binding character,29 becomes important once the 
existence of multiple equilibria and the necessity of a device for equilibrium selection is 
fully acknowledged. However, the presumption that the most efficient strategy pair will 
be chosen might well be wrong. The economic theory of international environmental 
cooperation could learn from regime theory that countries very often pay overwhelming 
attention to clearly perceivable distributional issues and are only little concerned about 
the rather abstract notion of Pareto-efficiency that dominates economic reasoning.30 
Most of the relevant literature of the economic theory of international environmental 
cooperation implicitly assumes that international environmental agreements will end up 
on the Pareto-efficient contract curve. Regime theory in general does not share this mis-
guided assumption. 
The selection among different equilibria resembles a coordination game for which 
many of the traditional findings from the simple Prisoner’s Dilemma literature are not 
valid anymore. As distributional issues come to the forefront, a long shadow of the fu-
ture can have a detrimental rather than beneficial effect on cooperation as it pays to hold 
out longer in the hope to reach a distributionally more favourable equilibrium for one-
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 Dockner and Long 1993, pp. 15 and 24. Characteristically for many contributions from the economic 
theory of international environmental cooperation, the papers by Botteon and Carraro and by Dockner 
and Long do not contain a single reference to the regime theory literature. 
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 Young 1989, pp. 368f. 
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self.31 Connected to this point, the economic theory of international environmental co-
operation could learn from realist regime theory to take into account that countries are 
concerned about relative in addition to absolute gains and losses.32 Economics with its 
preoccupation with efficiency has not paid enough attention to relative distributional 
issues and has to make up on this respect. A state might refuse to cooperate if it expects 
that its partners will gain relatively more from cooperation. Surely, what Joseph M. 
Grieco calls ‘state positionality’33 plays more of a role in security matters than in envi-
ronmental issues, even though a good case can be made that states pay attention to rela-
tive gains and losses as concerns natural resource exploitation and the costs of emission 
abatement.34 Also, Duncan Snidal has shown that if the number of states involved is 
large, relative gains maximisation will not constrain the scope for cooperation to a great 
extent.35 Nevertheless, it would pay economists to take state positionality into account in 
model building and examine how robust the results are. Similarly, economists have to 
pay more attention to how power in international relations determines who is allowed to 
play the game, who gets to move when and how power can be used to change the payoff 
matrix of the game.36 
More generally, the economic theory of international environmental cooperation 
could learn from the institutionally rich analysis of regime theory on the various func-
tions regimes provide and how they foster international cooperation. Economists could 
profit from a better understanding of how regimes can enlarge the shadow of the future 
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 See Snidal 1985, p. 936; Fearon 1998. 
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 Compare Grieco 1988. 
33
 ibid., p. 499. 
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 List and Rittberger 1992, pp. 93f. 
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 Snidal 1991a, 1991b. 
36
 Compare Krasner 1991. 
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in making interaction more durable and more frequent37 and how earlier mutually ad-
vantageous experience with regimes induces prospective partners to be more coopera-
tive in the building of new regimes — an aspect that Keohane circumscribes as the repu-
tational aspect of regimes.38 The analysis of the economic theory of international envi-
ronmental cooperation would be enriched by recognising how regimes provide ongoing 
negotiating processes that reduce transaction costs39 and help making transfers and link-
ages by clustering issues40. The same holds true for a recognition of how regimes pro-
vide monitoring and verification services41 as well as implementation review mecha-
nisms42. It can learn from regime theory how important regimes can be in strengthening 
the domestic capacity of weak governments to comply with an agreement via a transfer 
of technical assistance and general aid.43 
The economic theory of international environmental cooperation could also benefit 
from a better understanding of how important a participatory approach towards interna-
tional agreement making and procedurally fair rules are for bringing about cooperation. 
For example, substantially the same bargaining outcome that is accepted by a party if it 
feels sufficiently involved in the bargaining process can be rejected if the party feels 
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treated unjustly.44 The importance of procedural fairness holds especially true when par-
ticipants, as David Lewis Feldman observes, ‘do not bargain from pre-established posi-
tions, but, in many cases, enter into negotiations precisely to learn more about a prob-
lem’.45 An understanding of this aspect will also allow the economic theory of interna-
tional environmental cooperation to comprehend why at times individual leadership in 
negotiations and an exogenous crisis or shock, such as a nuclear power accident or satel-
lite pictures showing a hole in the ozone layer, are important in bringing about interna-
tional cooperation.46 Connected to this, the economic theory of international environ-
mental cooperation could learn from the weak cognitivist or epistemic community 
branch of regime theory how important a consensus community of scientists can be for 
bringing about negotiations and shaping state actors’ interests47 and how regimes help 
states to re-evaluate their interests48. How international networks of scientists can serve 
as catalysts and facilitators for regime formation has mostly been ignored by the eco-
nomic theory of international environmental cooperation. 
The finding from Young and Gail Osherenko that states tend to agree on uncompli-
cated formulas and across-the-board or equal relative emission cuts even if efficiency is 
sacrificed could teach economists that complicated formulas for the allocation of the 
burden of abatement such as those in the models of Parkash Chander and Henry 
Tulkens, that can theoretically achieve efficiency, are hopelessly unrealistic and would 
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never be agreed upon in real negotiations.49 As originally pointed out by Thomas C. 
Schelling, states look for ‘focal points’ or ‘salient solutions’ in international bargaining, 
not for highly complex formulas.50 Some initial steps in building more realistic models 
have already been undertaken. The models of Alfred Endres and Michael Finus and 
Finus and Bianca Rundshagen explicitly assume that players agree on uniform solutions 
for all participants in a game of incomplete information.51 They rationalise this assump-
tion in suggesting that uniform solutions appear to be ‘fair’ to all participants and have 
low transaction costs as an agreement on differentiated solutions would take more time. 
Also, the models assume that negotiating partners agree on the ‘smallest common de-
nominator’ solution at the end of the bargaining process. This is because no country can 
be forced to sign the agreement, hence the uniform solution cannot go beyond what the 
‘bottleneck country’ is willing to do.52 Both assumptions are frequently observed char-
acteristics of international environmental agreements and represent an important step 
towards making the economic theory of international environmental cooperation con-
form more with the reality of international bargaining on environmental issues. 
One concrete example on how regime theory might contest some of the empirical 
evidence that proponents of the economic theory of international environmental coop-
eration invoke in support of their propositions is the already mentioned study by Mur-
doch and Sandler.53 From a regime theoretic perspective, this study suffers from at least 
two major shortcomings: first, even if the reductions agreed upon in the Montreal Proto-
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col correspond with what Murdoch and Sandler predict as a Nash equilibrium, it might 
be misleading to call these ‘voluntary’ as they might have been undertaken in anticipa-
tion of the restraints an international environmental agreement such as the Montreal 
Protocol would impose on nation-states. Thus, Murdoch and Sandler are likely to under-
estimate the importance of international negotiations for bringing about these emission 
reductions. Second, and connected to the last point, it seems inappropriate to only look 
at the Montreal Protocol without looking at its various amendments which made emis-
sion reduction obligations more stringent. Even if the Montreal Protocol can be inter-
preted as codifying emission reductions nation-states would have undertaken anyway, it 
is much more doubtful whether the same could be said of the more stringent amend-
ments to the Protocol that followed suit. 
Another example is the similar finding in the already mentioned study by Murdoch, 
Sandler and Sargent on the Helsinki and Sofia Protocols.54 If international environ-
mental cooperation is not particularly deep here, this might have much more to do with 
the fact that it brought together countries with hugely different value systems at or 
shortly after the height of East-West tensions rather than with the problems of self-
enforcement and renegotiation-proofness. Given these differing value systems both Pro-
tocols might therefore be interpreted as a very successful example of regime formation 
in the face of enormous obstacles to negotiation rather than as evidence that the re-
quirements of self-enforcement and renegotiation-proofness will invariably prevent in-
ternational environmental cooperation from becoming deep. 
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4. Achieving wide and deep cooperation: Prospects for mutual learning opportuni-
ties 
So far I have tried to demonstrate how one school of thought can learn from the findings 
of the other. In this section, I shall present several examples for how regime theory and 
the economic theory of international environmental cooperation could fruitfully learn 
from each other. All the topics that I refer to here are part of ongoing projects by either 
regime theory or the economic theory of international environmental cooperation. How-
ever, it is the aim of this section to show how both streams of research might gain from 
cross fertilisation. 
 
COMPLIANCE. One such example is the question of why states comply with interna-
tional agreements and what this implies for the problem of free-riding. Abram Chayes 
and Antonia Handler Chayes have tried to show that non-compliance with the require-
ments of an agreement is the exception rather than the rule in the practice of interna-
tional relations.55 If non-compliance occurs it is often due to insufficient managerial 
capacity, rather than a deliberate decision to free-ride on others’ efforts. Chayes and 
Chayes conclude from their findings that the ‘free rider problem has been overesti-
mated’.56 This conclusion is highly contested, however. George W. Downs, David M. 
Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom have argued that the marginality of non-compliance is due 
to ‘the fact that most treaties require states to make only modest departures from what 
they would have done in the absence of an agreement’.57 Their argument is strongly 
supported by the basic result of the economic theory of international environmental co-
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operation, which clearly shows that free-riding is a great problem as it is the impotence 
to deter free-riding on a large scale that limits the gains to be achieved from coopera-
tion. Once the agreement has been reached, free-riding is no longer a major problem, but 
if free-riding had not been such a major problem in the first instance, another agreement 
with much deeper cooperation could have been reached. Indeed, because, implicitly and 
in effect, external free-riding is an extreme version of non-compliance, once free-riding 
has been deterred, non-compliance is no longer of concern.58 Thus, the conclusion by 
Chayes and Chayes does not follow from their findings if one takes the stage of agree-
ment making into account as well. On the other hand, the economic theory of interna-
tional environmental cooperation could learn from regime theory that sometimes perfect 
compliance by ‘weak’ governments is not even the outcome that ‘strong’ governments 
expect. As Levy, Keohane and Haas observe, regime standards are often set higher than 
many countries with weak environmental preferences either want to comply with or 
countries with weak administrative capacity can comply with.59 This is because high 
regime standards serve other functions as well, such as generating political concern in 
‘weak countries’ and setting normative goals for them, communicating the intensity of 
preferences among regime members and legitimating technical aid or outright transfer 
payments that might otherwise be denounced as bribes or blackmail. 
 
UNILATERAL ACTION. As another example for mutual learning opportunities, con-
sider the issue of unilateral emission abatement by one country. Game theoretic models 
of Hoel and of Endres and Finus show how unilateral emission abatement by one coun-
try can be detrimental to the environment because it can lower the abatement incentives 
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of other countries in a potential future agreement.60 This result holds only true under 
certain restrictive assumptions, however. For example, countries are supposed to know 
exactly their payoffs and to maximise their own payoff with the exception of the unilat-
erally acting country. Regime theory could learn here from the economic theory of in-
ternational environmental cooperation about how important it is to trace the perverse 
strategic effects a well-intended action can have under certain conditions. At the same 
time, the economic theory of international environmental cooperation could learn from 
regime theory that these very same conditions that give rise to their model results need 
not hold in reality. In real-world international bargaining, countries do not know their 
exact payoffs and unilateral action by one country can be regarded by potential partici-
pants to an agreement as a constructive, confidence building step towards regime build-
ing. Unilateral action can help overcome a deadlock in negotiations by pushing ahead 
and demonstrating that a country is credibly committed to cooperation and, possibly, 
also by proving to potential partners to an agreement that emission abatement is less 
expensive than commonly believed. 
 
RULES, NORMS, AND CONVENTIONS. Maybe the highest return from mutual 
learning is likely to stem from exploring how the basic finding from the economic the-
ory of international environmental cooperation could be overcome. How can wide and 
deep cooperation in international environmental affairs be achieved? This is the funda-
mental question that has to be tackled. There is no convincing answer yet, but there are 
some attempts to show how the problems of self-enforcement and renegotiation-
proofness can be mitigated at least. 
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Schmidt, for example, proposes that the deposition of securities at third parties — for 
example, at international institutions — or the exchange of ‘hostages’ could help coun-
tries making threats credible. The idea is that these deposits or hostages are automati-
cally lost if countries do not execute their threat to punish free-riders. In principle, 
threats that were not credible before can be made credible with such a device if the de-
posit or hostage is appropriately specified. The problem with this proposal, however, is 
that the deposit or the exchange of hostages is itself not renegotiation-proof. A country 
which stands to lose its deposit could always engage in negotiations with the agency 
holding the deposit to strike another deal and avoid the loss. Equally, countries can al-
ways engage in negotiations with each other to get their hostages back.61 
Another attempt derives from the idea that behaviour is not fully determined by util-
ity maximisation, but also governed by rules and norms. Hoel and Schneider show in a 
game theoretic model how deeper cooperation is possible if countries are inhibited from 
free-riding excessively because they follow the social norm and convention that free-
riding is undesirable.62 
Yet another attempt sticks to the assumption of utility maximisation, but includes 
more items in the utility function than usual. Carsten Schmidt, for example, uses the 
idea that countries might refrain from free-riding for fear of being blamed as opportunis-
tic. In other words, the reputation of being regarded as a responsible member of the in-
ternational community of nation-states represents an important factor in the utility func-
tion of state actors.63 But where do these norms and conventions come from and why do 
states not simply break them if they run counter to their own selfish interests, as realism 
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would have it?64 Why do countries not want to be blamed as opportunistic? Here, re-
gime theory can provide initial steps for a better understanding. Both Snidal and Litfin 
argue that once international regimes have come into existence, they gain, to some ex-
tent, an independent life on their own.65 They change actors’ expectations, they change 
the rules of the game, they make actors’ decisions transparent, they initiate further steps 
and push issues forward — in short, they start to constrain state behaviour. After the 
establishing of regimes the states that created the regime are no longer free to do as they 
please.66 States get accustomed to cooperation and successful interaction in one regime 
makes the establishing of the next one more likely. The strong cognitivist branch of re-
gime theory, as it is called by Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittber-
ger67, even argues that successful regime building induces the participating states to de-
velop a collective identity that helps them to sustain cooperation even in situations 
where one or the other state would otherwise defect.68 But we need to better understand 
how these transformations come about and why sovereign nation-states are willing to 
agree in the first instance on mechanisms that constrain their very sovereignty later on. 
In there lies the real challenge to both regime theory and the economic theory of interna-
tional environmental cooperation individually and to both of them together. 
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Another promising way to mitigate the negative impact the requirements of self-
enforcement and renegotiation-proofness have on the scope and depth of cooperation 
comes through the idea that states follow to some extent considerations of fairness. 
Fairness here means two things. First, players behave cooperatively if others behave 
cooperatively, even if, strictly speaking, it is in their selfish interest to free ride on oth-
ers’ cooperation. This aspect means that the problem of free-riding is less pronounced 
than if states were not concerned with fairness. Second, players are willing to punish 
defectors, even if, strictly speaking, it is in their selfish interest to refrain from punish-
ment. This aspect means that free-riding can be deterred to a greater extent, as punish-
ment can be more severe than dictated by the selfish interest of the punisher. Certainly, 
considerations of fairness encounter limits. If the incentives to free ride become over-
whelming, then players defect even if the others maintain cooperation. Similarly, if the 
harm inflicted upon oneself due to punishing a defector becomes too big, the potential 
punisher has to let the defector get away without punishment. But if considerations of 
fairness play some role in international bargaining, then deeper cooperation becomes 
possible. This is confirmed by a model of Tim Jeppesen and Per Andersen who use the 
pioneering work by Matthew Rabin.69 The challenge is to better understand why and to 
what extent states take considerations of fairness into account and what factors promote 
these considerations as well as factors that lead to their disregard. 
 
ISSUE LINKAGE. Another mechanism to promote cooperation – and one that has 
long since been recognised – is issue linkage.70 Issue linkage strengthens the incentives 
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for mutual cooperation by linking games with an asymmetric payoff structure.71 Issue 
linkage functions best if one set of players has a strong interest in cooperation in one 
issue, but not in another one, whereas another set of players has the opposite preference 
structure. Hence, in order to promote cooperation issue linkage depends on countries 
being asymmetric in their preferences and, in some sense, the more asymmetric coun-
tries are the better are the prospects for issue linkage. The aspect just considered looks at 
issue linkage as a means to transform mutual cooperation into the common interest of 
all players – something that is often already implicitly assumed in regarding the problem 
of international environmental cooperation as a Prisoner’s Dilemma.72 
But issue linkage can also be used if the underlying game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
right from the start and it can mitigate the problems of self-enforcement and renegotia-
tion-proofness for this game. Barrett shows how linking an international environmental 
agreement with trade can promote cooperation.73 Trade sanctions are a more credible 
threat to deter free-riding than an increase in emissions because, according to Barrett, 
trade sanctions mainly harm the free-rider, whereas the emission increase considerably 
harms the punisher as well.74 Hence, with trade sanctions free-riding can be deterred 
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more effectively as a more substantial punishment becomes credible, so wider and 
deeper cooperation can be achieved as a self-enforcing and renegotiation-proof equilib-
rium.75 A similar mechanism is employed in the models in Carraro and Domenico 
Siniscalco and Botteon and Carraro.76 International environmental cooperation is linked 
to joint efforts into research and development. The idea is that in contrast to emission 
abatement which benefits potential free-riders as well, research and development can be 
considered a club good which benefits the participants of an agreement only. Hence po-
tential free-riders have an incentive to join the agreement if the gains from joint research 
and development exceed the gains from free-riding on the other countries’ emission 
abatement. 
These arguments seem to suggest that issue linkage is a very promising means to 
promote international environmental cooperation. One must not disregard the many 
problematic aspects of issue linkage, however. Indeed, the early contributions from re-
gime theory, while praising issue linkage as a means to foster cooperation, have at the 
same time stressed the problems of linkage. Robert D. Tollison and Thomas D. Wilett, 
for example, emphasise the increase in transaction costs that can result from issue link-
age.77 James K. Sebenius’ influential and insightful discussion of issue linkage points 
out that issue linkage can make mutual cooperation less rather than more likely if divi-
sive issues are linked and a joint settlement is required.78 
As concerns the employment of trade sanctions to bring about international environ-
mental cooperation, all depends on one’s implicit view on the benefits from trade. Many 
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proponents of trade liberalisation would object to the suggestion, implicit in Barrett’s 
analysis, that trade sanctions do not harm the sanctioning party to a great extent. Indeed, 
they would object to the very idea that trade liberalisation is a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
where all gain from mutual liberalisation, but every player gains even more if only the 
other players open their markets for trade. Many liberal international economists would 
instead maintain that it is always in a country’s best interest to open its market no matter 
what other countries do.79 If this view on trade liberalisation is correct, however, then 
trade sanctions are not necessarily a credible threat to deter free-riding and cannot pro-
mote cooperation to a large extent. The challenge is to find specific trade areas for 
which sanctions hurt the free-riding countries substantially more than the cooperating 
countries. Also, if trade sanctions are actually executed against free-riders then there is 
the risk that these countries retaliate in imposing sanctions as well and that cooperation 
in other issue areas might collapse. 
Another problem of international environmental agreements employing trade sanc-
tions is that they can potentially clash with existing and quite powerful international 
trading regimes such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The Montreal Protocol 
on the banning of ozone-damaging substances is the major agreement so far that has 
included the threat of trade sanctions, both against the substances themselves as well as 
against goods produced with the help of these substances.80 Participation in the Protocol 
is by now almost universal and trade sanctions were never actually employed, which 
might partly explain why no member to the WTO has ever challenged the trade clauses 
in the Protocol. There seems to be a consensus among scholars, however, that the Proto-
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col’s trade incentives have been very important (see, for example, French 1994, p. 62; 
Brack 1996, p. 55; Barrett 1997b, p. 346; OECD 1999, p. 4). But major doubts remain 
whether the Protocol is compatible with the obligations under the WTO regime.81 The 
same holds potentially true for future agreements. How future international environ-
mental agreements that employ trade sanctions to deter free-riding can be made com-
patible with WTO and other trade regimes is a major topic for fruitful research.82 
As concerns linking international environmental cooperation to joint research and 
development efforts, problems arise if there are diminishing returns to these efforts, be-
cause then it can be optimal to exclude some countries from the linked agreement even 
though they should be participants to the agreement judged from the environmental per-
spective alone. In some sense, this is the opposite problem to free-riding and it can dam-
age rather than promote environmental cooperation under certain conditions.83 A more 
fundamental problem with this form of linkage is that it remains unclear why countries 
have not long since realised the mutual gains from joint research and development ef-
forts independent of the problem of international environmental cooperation. In other 
words, why do countries wait until the free-riding problems in an international environ-
mental agreement necessitate linkage in order to reap the excludable benefits from joint 
research and development? 
All the mentioned problems of issue linkage notwithstanding, it could form a major 
object for common research of regime theory and the economic theory of international 
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environmental cooperation. The question is how the problems of linkage can be reduced 
and how linkage has to be employed such that it best promotes international environ-
mental cooperation. In this respect, Stephan Kroll, Charles F. Mason and Jason F. 
Shogren have provided an interesting finding that deserves further attention.84 In labora-
tory experiments, they have studied the question whether issue linkage is likely to pro-
mote cooperation more if the linkage is implicit (two games played simultaneously in a 
parallel institutional framework) or explicit (the linked game is played in a joint institu-
tional framework). They have found that the participants in their experiments were 
much more likely to cooperate in the joint than in the parallel framework. It would be 
interesting to explore whether this finding is robust and whether it is relevant outside the 
laboratory as well. If so, then this finding would clearly call for explicitly linking issues 
in one single negotiation rather than holding parallel but separate negotiations at the 
same time — under the condition that transaction costs are not substantially higher for 
explicit issue linkage. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has tried to show that there is a lot to gain for both regime theory and the 
economic theory of international environmental cooperation from learning from each 
other. Regime theorists have first coined the metaphor of ‘cooperation under anarchy’, 
but regime theory can learn from the economic theory of international environmental 
cooperation about the adverse consequences on cooperation that follow from the re-
quirements of self-enforceability and renegotiation-proofness of international environ-
mental agreements as well as from emission leakage and ‘perverse’ strategic incentives. 
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The economic theory of international environmental cooperation, on the other hand, can 
benefit from a better understanding of the myriad roles regimes play in promoting coop-
eration and can learn from the institutionally rich analysis of regime theory. 
Learning from the other school of thought is important, but it is merely a first step 
and it is somewhat one-sided. Examples were provided for which the two can fruitfully 
learn from each other such as the consequences of unilateral action on international co-
operation and why nation-states comply with international agreements and what this 
implies for the problem of free-riding. The most interesting question, however, is one 
that each school of thought has long since examined of its own: how can cooperation in 
international environmental affairs become wider and deeper? The focus should be on 
two things: first, on the role regimes play in developing social norms, conventions and 
considerations of fairness that limit free-riding and second, on the role of issue linkage, 
especially with respect to trade sanctions. 
The question is of course whether mutual learning is possible at all and whether it 
would not diminish the relative strengths of both regime theory and the economic theory 
of international environmental cooperation. Would, for example, trying to include some 
of the insights from regime theory not diminish the elegance and explanatory power of 
the models employed within the economic theory of international environmental coop-
eration? Admittedly, this is a possibility that cannot be dismissed offhand. It would be 
beyond the scope of this paper to explore the limits of mutual learning opportunities 
here. However, in principle I can see no reason why mutual learning would have to be 
impossible or counter-productive. After all, as mentioned, some economists like Endres, 
Finus and Rundshagen have already successfully integrated insights from regime theory 
about the prevalence of fairness considerations and uniform solutions into their model 
building. Conversely, scholars of regime theory who have employed game theory in 
examining what influence free-rider incentives, punishment costs and insider-outsider 
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dynamics have on the emergence and effectiveness of regimes have certainly advanced 
regime theory. To make my point clear this paper has stressed and possibly at times 
even over-emphasised the differences between the economic theory of international en-
vironmental cooperation and regime theory. To some extent at least, the two schools of 
thought are at times not quite as far apart in their methodological and conceptual 
framework as might have been suggested here. However, it remains true that even in 
these cases explicit notice of the other school of thought is rarely taken. 
Because of space restrictions, this paper could only sketch some of the major findings 
from both schools and outline the topics for which mutual learning opportunities are 
greatest. All these topics have long since been examined by each school separately and 
in this respect this paper has not proposed any new topic for studying. What it has hope-
fully achieved, however, is to convince readers that if scholars from both schools of 
thought took more notice of each other and aspired to learn from each other’s findings, 
then this would lead to a more comprehensive analysis and better understanding. With 
these come better policy advice. If we can help policy makers to succeed in tackling 
international environmental problems, then we do our best. 
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